NOTES
A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

AN AGENCY'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC. V. NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL
The Supreme Court of the United States has established two
different standards of review in examining an administrative agency's

interpretation of the statute it is authorized to administer"reasonableness"

and "rightness."'

The Court, in applying the

"reasonableness" standard, defers to the agency's interpretation if that

interpretation has a reasonable basis in the statute. 2 In applying the
"rightness" standard, the Court examines the statute and independently
determines the "correct" interpretation of the statute. 3 The issue in the
"reasonableness" inquiry is whether the agency's interpretation is a
justifiable construction of the statute; the issue in a "rightness" inquiry is
whether the agency's interpretation matches the judicially-determined
"correct" interpretation.
The perplexing feature of this duality is that the Supreme Court has
never provided any doctrinal guidelines to explain why one test rather
than the other should be applied. 4 A review of Supreme Court cases over
1. See K. DAVIS, 1982 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.00-6, 30.00
(1982) (standard of review defies encapsulation by formula; sometimes Court substitutes judgment,
sometimes rational basis test used) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS, 1982 SUPPLEMENT]; K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.07 (Supp. 1970) (Supreme Court cases inconsistent, no
opinion attempts to explain why) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS, 1970 SUPPLEMENT]; 4 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.07 (1958) (Court has never attempted to explain why it
substitutes judgment in one case yet uses rational basis test in others) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS];

JAFFE, JudicialReview: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REV. 239, 258-62 (1955) (identifying two
types of Supreme Court cases, one focusing on "correct" construction, the other accepting agency's
reasonable interpretation); Note, Perfecting the Partnership: Structuring the Judicial Control of
Administrative Determinationsof Questions ofLaw, 31 VAND.L. REV. 91, 111-26 (1978) (reviewing
Supreme Court decisions establishing the two standards of review).
2. See eg., 4 DAVIS, supra note 1, § 30.05 (Court sometimes accepts agency interpretation if
it has a "rational basis").
3. See, eg., id § 30.06 (Court often substitutes its judgment on construction of statute for
agency's interpretation).
4. See, eg., id. §§ 30.01, 30.07 (Court has never attempted to provide systematic statement of
theory that guides its selection of scope of review); Coffman, Judicial Review of Administrative
InterpretationsofStatutes, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (no consistent rationale explaining
why one approach selected); Schwartz, Administrative Law, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 87-88 (1957)
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the past decade reveals an almost random application of the two tests.5
Although the Court has often stated that in review of agency
interpretations of statutes, the existence of an agency construction "sets

'the framework for judicial review,'"6 it has never established that
analytic framework.

In Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,7 the
Supreme Court may have forged the analytic framework for assessing the
validity of an administrative agency's construction of the statute that it is

charged with administering. The Court in Chevron announced a twostep method of analysisA Initially, a reviewing court must determine
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 9
If Congress did not address the precise question, the court must defer to
the agency interpretation if that interpretation is "a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute." 10

This note briefly surveys Supreme Court decisions that have
established the divergent standards of review,1 1 analyzes Chevron and its

two-step method of analysis, 12 and examines the Court's decisions in the

13
subsequent Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors cases
and in ChemicalManufacturersAssociation v. NaturalResources Defense
Council.14 The note concludes that Chevron, in establishing a framework
of analysis for review of an agency interpretation of the statute in its

charge, is a significant decision providing long-awaited guidance to the
lower federal courts. 15
(observing that Court failed to follow recent precedent establishing standard of review and did not
distinguish or overrule); Note, supra note 1, at 114 (no combination of factors adequately explains
Court's differing treatment).
5. See infra note 24.
6. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)).
7. 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).
8. Id. at 2781 (reviewing court is confronted with two questions).
9. Id. In this step, a court must determine whether the statutory terms reflect a clear
congressional intent. Id. at 2782 n.9. A court makes this determination by employing the
"traditional tools of statutory construction." Id.
10. Id at 2783 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
11. See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 32-77 and accompanying text.
13. The two cases, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984)
[hereinafter referred to as Securities Industry/I], and Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors,
104 S.Ct. 3003 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as SecuritiesIndustry I1], were announced on June 28,
1984; Chevron was announced on June 25, 1984, Chevron, 104 U.S. at 2778. See infra notes 78-123
and accompanying text.
14. 53 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1985). See infra notes 124-96 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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I.

CONFLICTING STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Numerous commentators have recognized that the Supreme Court
has failed to establish any uniform method of analyzing a statute when
the agency charged with administering the statute has already promulgated an interpretation.16 The decisions break down into two general
approaches-those emphasizing a "reasonableness" standard and those
involving the "rightness" of the administrative interpretation. 17 Even
within these two classifications, the Court is not consistent; the "reasonableness" line of cases reflects a deferential judicial attitude rather than
the application of a specific uniform standard of review.' 8
In a case illustrating both standards, NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 19 the Court reviewed the National Labor Relations Board's ruling
that "newsboys" were "employees" within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act. 20 The Court first reviewed the statute, independent
of the interpretation presented by the agency, and concluded that Congress had not intended that the definition of "employees" depend upon
21
the employee/independent contractor distinction of state common law.
This portion of the opinion exemplifies a "rightness" approach; the Court
reviewed the statute and formulated its own interpretation. The Hearst
Publicationsdecision, however, is more often recognized for the "reasonableness" standard announced toward the end of the opinion.22 The
16. See infra note 1.
17. A court employing a "rightness" standard interprets the statute independent of the agency
interpretation, treating the case as it would any case that hinges on statutory interpretation. Under
the "reasonableness" standard, the agency interpretation carries a presumption of validity and the
court defers to that administrative construction if it is reasonable. A court employing a "reasonableness" approach "looks to see whether the [interpretation] harmonizes with the plain language of the
statute, its origin, and its purpose," National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
477 (1979) (emphasis added), and not whether the interpretation is the best reflection of the congressional mandate. Examples of cases where the Supreme Court employed a "rightness" approach (the
terms "substitution of judgment" or "de novo review" are synonymous) are discussed infra in note
24, while examples of opinions reciting a "reasonableness" standard are described infra in notes 18
and 24.
18. The "reasonableness" standard has assumed many different forms. See, eg., United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (deference owed to agency construction if it "'implement[s] the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner' ") (quoting United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) (issue was whether agencies' "construction was 'sufficiently reasonable' to be
accepted") (quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) (agency construction upheld unless "demonstrably irrational").
19. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
20. Id. at 113.
21. Id. at 124-29. In the Court's opinion, Congress intended a much broader definition of the
term. Id. at 129.
22. See, e.g., Coffman, supra note 4, at 14-15 (citing Hearst Publications as "reasonableness"
case in comparison of "reasonableness" and "rightness" cases).
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Court stated: "where the question is one of specific application of a

broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering
the statute must determine it initially [the agency determination] is to be

accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."'23
An examination of recent cases reveals that the Court continues to
apply both standards in an apparently random fashion; 24 often an opin-

23. Hearst Publications,322 U.S. at 131.
24. In the last ten years the Court has deferred to the agencies' interpretations in a wide variety
of settings. In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), the Court found the
construction by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the Clean Air Act "sufficiently
reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency."
Id. at 87. In upholding a construction of the Truth in Lending Act promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board, Ford Motor Credit v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court concluded that the
"Act is best construed by those who gave it substance in promulgating regulations thereunder" and
that "judges ought to refrain from substituting their own interstitial lawmaking." Id. at 566, 568.
In Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court admonished a court of appeals for encroaching upon the Attorney General's authority to define "extreme hardship" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, stating that the
Attorney General and his delegates may construe the term "narrowly should they deem it wise to do
so." Id. at 145.
The Court has indicated that a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) interpretation of
the statutory term "in the public interest" may be sustained if based on a reasoned weighing of
competing policies. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981). In another case the
Court held that it was not the function of a court reviewing an Federal Election Commission (FEC)
construction to "interpret the statute as it thought best," but rather to determine whether the interpretation was "'sufficiently reasonable' to be accepted." Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) (quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)).
Application of the rational basis test is not tantamount to the automatic approval of the
agency's construction. In United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982), the Court, reviewing a treasury regulation, first considered whether the agency's interpretation was in harmony
with the statutory language. Id. at 25-26. Finding that inquiry inconclusive, the Court then examined the legislative history. Id. at 26-32. The agency's interpretation was found to be inconsistent
with both the understanding of Congress as manifested in the House and Senate committee reports
and the explanation of the provision the agency suggested to Congress at the time the statute was
proposed. Id. at 27-32. The Court thus invalidated the regulation as an unreasonable interpretation
of the statute. Id. at 19, 34-35.
Many cases support the proposition that a court, in reviewing an agency's construction of the
statute it administers, can review the statute, develop its own interpretation, and substitute its judgment for that of the agency. In NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951), the Court
independently determined whether a specific labor union was a "national or international labor organization" within the meaning of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, id. at 324-26. In
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), the Court examined a regulation promulgated by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs narrowly limiting the agency's function in providing benefits to Indians on reservations. Ia at 209-10. The Court perceived a broader meaning in the statute that provided the agency
with its general authority and invalidated the agency's regulation: "In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent with congressional purpose." Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
If the Court engages in de novo review of the statute, invalidation of the agency's construction
does not automatically result. In Northwest Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977),
the Court reviewed the decision of a quasi-adjudicatory body within the Department of Labor that
had liberally construed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act to extend coy-
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ion employing one standard fails to acknowledge the plethora of cases
adopting the other standard.25 Although resourceful commentators have
advanced several models of judicial review in an attempt to explain this
inconsistency, each author recognizes significant flaws in his own theory. 26 The most primitive explanation-that the announced "standard"

is simply a device to facilitate the drafting of the opinion-"reasonableness" if the agency interpretation is affirmed, "rightness" if it is invalidated 27 -accounts for neither the large number of "rightness" cases that
validate the agency interpretation nor these cases ostensibly finding an
'28
agency's construction "unreasonable.
The deliberate failure of the Supreme Court to establish a cohesive
analytic framework in this area 29 has left the lower courts without guierage to certain injured laborers. See id at 251-52, 255. Although the Court ignored the agency
interpretation in its review of the statute, it independently arrived at the same construction adopted
by the agency. Id. at 281. See also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1962)
(independent analysis of statute and record leads Court to same conclusion as agency); FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 542-45 (1960) (Court's independent view of § 2(a) of Clayton
Act same as that adopted by FTC); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1947)
(Court's "plain meaning" interpretation in accord with agency's construction).
25. See, eg., Highland Park 341 U.S. at 324-26 (employing "rightness" analysis and ignoring
rational basis test line of cases).
26. Professor Davis identified three factors in an attempt to uncover some consistency in the
Court's seemingly sporadic application of the rational basis test: comparative qualifications of courts
and agencies, extent of power conveyed to the agency, and the generality or specificity of the statutory term. 4 DAVIS, supra note 1, §§ 30.08-30.11. He has recently indicated, however, that
"[p]erhaps. . .the Court prefers its own unguided discretion in each case." DAVIS, 1982 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, § 30.00 at 584. Moreover, Professor Jaffe's attempts to reconcile the inconsistency of the Court's application of the differing standards in his "clear purpose" test, see Jaffe, supra
note 1, was, as Professor Davis later recognized, a proposal for future action and not an explanation
of past judicial action. See DAVIS, supra note 1, § 30.07.
An explanation recently advanced for the Court's use of the rational basis test pivoted on
whether the agency's construction extends the agency's preexisting scope of authority. See Coffman,
supra note 4. Professor Coffman has indicated that
[t]he guiding principle seems to be that where a particular interpretation involves an issue
as to whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority, the Court has ordinarily
faced and resolved that type of issue in a substantially independent manner. When the
agency's scope of authority has been resolved, interpretations of statutory issues within the
agency's area of discretion, if reasonable, have been favorably decided in the agency's behalf.
k at 12 (footnote omitted). Professor Coffman, however, admits that this "principle" is not without
its "aberrations." Id. at 20 n.126.
27. Professors Gellhor and Robinson have expressed a "suspicion that the rules governing
judicial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape," and argue that even when
courts articulate a standard of review, it "is seldom useful to understanding the result or predicting
future results." Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectiveson AdministrativeLaw, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771,
780 (1975).
28. See supra note 24.
29. In Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), Judge Friendly
recognized the inconsistent lines of authority, and invited a clarification of the law. Ia at 49. The
Supreme Court, however, declined the invitation, affirming the court of appeals decision in an opin-
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dance. 30 Although the Court has often stated that the existence of an
agency's statutory interpretation "only sets 'the framework for judicial
analysis,'"31 the Court has never defined that framework.
II.
A.

CHEVRON" THE SOLUTION?

Supreme Court Employs Two-Step Analysis.

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,32 the
Supreme Court articulated and employed a framework of analysis distinct from either the "rightness" or "reasonableness" approach. At issue
in Chevron was an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation 33
interpreting a provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 34
Section 172 of the Act provides that in order to construct or operate a
new or modified "major stationary source"-a source of air pollution
producing more than 100 tons of pollutants annually-in an area yet to
attain federally prescribed air quality standards, the applicant must satisfy several stringent criteria listed in Section 173.35 In the challenged
ion that employed a "rightness" analysis while failing to refer to any "reasonableness" cases. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
30. The Court's failure to provide guidance in this area is evidenced by the wide variety of
standards of review employed in the lower courts. See Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696
F.2d 1325, 1329 (lth Cir. 1983) (great deference to agency's construction if it involves agency's
expertise and lack of judicial expertise); Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d 378,
383 (5th Cir. 1982) (court may not invalidate agency's interpretation merely because judges would
interpret statute differently); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(deference to agency's construction not unitary concept applied equally to all issues; if some issues
involve scientific expertise and others do not, court will grant more deference on former); Olivares v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 685 F.2d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982) (agency interpretation
accepted unless demonstrably irrational or clearly contrary to plain and sensible meaning of statute);
New Jersey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 1282 (3d Cir. 1981) (courts
remain free to substitute judgment for that of agency); Union Elec. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 668 F.2d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1981) (courts show great deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes, particular deference accorded to Internal Revenue Service); Ithaca College v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.) (courts have final word on statutory interpretation), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 975 (1980); Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 1979) (deference
granted to agency interpretation if such interpretation is consistent with congressional purpose).
31. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)).
32. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
33. Id.at 2780.
34. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 746-48 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1982)) (adding § 172 to the Clean Air Act).
35. Before any new or modified "major stationary source" may be built a state agency must
determine that (1) there will be sufficient reductions in emissions in the region both to offset the
emissions from the proposed source and to allow for future progress toward attainment of air quality
standards, or the increase in emissions will not exceed a statutory allowance for industrial growth;
(2) the party requesting approval has certified that its other facilities in the state comply with the
state-implemented plan (SIP) for reduction of emissions; (3) the SIP is otherwise being implemented;
and (4) the proposed source complies with lowest achievable emission rate standards. Id. § 129,
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regulation, the EPA defined "source" by adopting the "bubble concept."
The "bubble concept" provides that an entire plant is treated as a
"source" and replacements of individual pieces of process equipment are
exempt from application of the stringent criteria as long as the total emis36
sion level of the plant is not increased.
Organizations representing environmental interests disagreed with
this interpretation, arguing that a more inclusive definition was required
37
in order to fulfill the congressional mandate of the clean air laws.
These organizations brought suit against the EPA, asserting that Con-

gress intended a definition of "source" that would subject the maximum
amount of industrial activity to the stringent environmental requirements
of section

173.38

Accordingly, the organizations argued for a definition

of "source" that included any pollution-producing unit of equipment, or
aggregate thereof, that produced more than 100 tons of pollutants
39
annually.
The Supreme Court reviewed the agency interpretation and, in an
91 Stat. at 748 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982) (adding § 173 to the Clean Air Act)). "Major
stationary source" is defined by the Act as "any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which
directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant."
Id. § 301(j), 91 Stat. at 770 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (1982)).
36. See 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981). The challenged regulation was promulgated in response to
the Reagan Administration's "'[g]overnment-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and complexities.'" Chevron, 104S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281 (1981)). The earlier regulation
adopted a bifurcated definition of "source"; the "bubble concept" was used in those provisions of the
Act aimed at maintaining air quality, while "source" was defined as individual pieces of process
equipment for provisions dealing with areas that had not attained air quality standards. Chevron,
104 S. Ct. 2788-89 & n.29 (discussing 45 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (1980)). The EPA argued "that the dual
definition 'can act as a disincentive to new investment and modernization by discouraging modifications to existing facilities' and 'can actually retard progress in air pollution control by discouraging
replacement of older, dirtier processes or pieces of equipment with new, cleaner ones."' Chevron
104 S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281 (1981)). The revised regulation simplified the regulatory complexity by giving "source" the "bubble concept" definition in all provisions. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 16,281 (1981) (outlining reasons for adopting new regulation, including reduction of confusion
and inconsistency).
Because of the unique designation of the concept underlying the EPA's interpretation of
"source," Chevron is commonly referred to as "the bubble case." See eg., DeLong, The Bubble
Case, 10 AD. L. NEws, Fall 1984, at 1.
37. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2780-81, 2790. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Citizens for
a Better Environment, and the Northwestern Ohio Lung Association brought suit against the EPA.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. CL 2778 (1984). Industry sided
with the agency. Id.
38. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2790. The statutory requirements are listed supra at note 35.
39. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2790. In challenging the EPA regulation, the plaintiff environmental
organizations did not allege any procedural infirmity; the challenge was limited to the substantce of
the agency's interpretation of the statute. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685
F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The controversy centers on the appropriate definition of the word
'source' for the purpose of implementing the statutory scheme."), rev'd sub nom. Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. CL 2778 (1984).
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opinion by Justice Stevens for a unanimous Court, 4° announced a novel
two-step method of analysis. The Court required a reviewing court to
first ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue."' 4 1 If the court, "employing traditional tools of statutory interpretation," 42 determines that the intent of Congress is "clear," then it must
effectuate that "unambiguously expressed intent." 43 If, on the other
hand, the court determines that the statute and legislative history are
silent or ambiguous with regard to the issue, it must uphold the agency's
interpretation if it is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute."44
Application of this analysis to the Chevron facts was straightforward. The Court found that neither the statute nor the legislative history
contained a specific definition of "source"4 5 and proceeded to the second
step of the analysis, where it determined that the EPA's definition of
"source" did not expand the typical scope of the term. 6 The Court,
noting that the legislative history disclosed that Congress was concerned
with both the environmental interest in improving air quality and the
economic interest in allowing industry to engage in capital improvements, 47 compared the EPA interpretation with these congressional
concerns:
the plant wide definition is fully consistent with one of these concerns-the allowance of reasonable economic growth-and, whether
or not we believe it effectively implements the other, we must recognize
that the EPA has advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion
48
that the regulations serve the environmental objectives as well.

Summarizing the plaintiffs' case as a challenge that "really centers on the
49
wisdom of the agency's policy," the Court upheld the EPA regulation.
40. Although the decision was unanimous, only six justices participated. Justice Marshall and
Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case, while Justice

O'Connor did not participate in the decision. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2794.
41. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2781.

42. Id. at 2782 n.9.
43. Id. at 2781-82. The first step of the analysis is dispositive of the issue if a court finds the

intent of Congress to be clear. Id. at 2781 ("if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter"). Thus in some cases a reviewing court need never examine the "reasonableness" of the

agency's interpretation.
44. Id at 2782.
45. Id at 2786, 2791 ("language [of statute] is not dispositive" and "legislative history. . . is
unilluminating").
46. Id at 2790 ("it is certainly no affront to common English usage to take a reference to a

major facility or a major source to connote an entire plant as opposed to its constituent parts").
47. Id at 2786 (citing H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 211, reprintedin 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1290.
48. Id at 2792.

49. Id. at 2793-94.
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Chevron: Interpretationas InterstitialLawmaking.

It is evident that the Chevron Court applied a method of analysis
distinct from either the "rightness" or "reasonableness" approaches.
Although the Court cited cases employing de novo review in support of
51
the first step of its analysis 50 and "reasonableness" cases for the second,
the Chevron analysis is more than a sequential arrangement of the two
established analytic models. Chevron is distinctive because the Court examined the relationship of Congress, administrative agencies, and the

courts, and advanced a coherent framework for structuring judicial review in this area.

The Chevron analysis is patterned after the traditional analytic
framework employed by a court reviewing any action of any other governmental branch.5 2 The first-step of the Chevron analysis requires a re50. The Court, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9, referred to SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 114
(1978) (Court analyzed issue of statutory interpretation as though SEC interpretation carried no
more force than argument advanced by any litigant); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 731, 746 (1973) (Court invalidates agency construction even though it recognized
statute was "ambiguous in scope"); Volkswagenwerk v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261,
272 (1968) ("[courts] 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their atfirmance of administrative decisions they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional
policy underlying a staute.' ") (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (in final
analysis, courts must supply the legal standard set forth in words of statute); Social Sec. Bd. v.
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) (role of judiciary to define limits of statutory power; agency's
interpretation that limited its power was improper); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16
(1932) (Court not bound by administrative construction; agency interpretation "will be taken into
account only to the extent that it is supported by valid reasons"); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331,
342 (1896) (Court did not indicate that administrative agency had promulgated interpretation of
statutory language at issue until last paragraph of eleven-page opinion). The Court in Chevron, 104
S. Ct. at 2782 n.9, also cited Federal Election Corm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27 (1981), which is discussed infra note 51.
51. The Court, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 n.ll, cited Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437
U.S. 443, 451 (1978) (analysis of regulation reveals that it is "far from unreasonable"); Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1978) (agency interpretation upheld if "sufficiently reasonable"); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965) (court must affirm agency interpretation if it is not unreasonable); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 15354 (1946) (reviewing court's function limited; must sustain agency interpretation if it has "reasonable
basis in law") (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)); McLaren v.
Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1921) (Court presumed agency construction valid; found no "cogent
reasons" to invalidate).
Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981), was
cited by the Court as support for both the first and second steps of its analysis, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at
2782 n.9, n. 11, because that case presages Chevron to some degree. In DemocraticSenatorial Campaign Comm., the Court initially determined that the statute and its legislative history were ambiguous, 454 U.S. at 31-36, and then shifted its inquiry to whether the agency's construction was
"sufficiently reasonable" to merit approval. Id. at 39 (quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)).
52. A court in reviewing any action of any branch of government first defines the boundaries of
legitimate authority, and then determines whether the action taken falls within that domain. See
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viewing court to determine whether Congress has explicitly or implicitly
authorized the agency to act in an interpretive role.5 3 The reviewing
court examines the agency's construction only after it has determined
that Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the agency.5 4 In
the second step, the court determines whether the agency's interpretation
has a rational basis in the statute.5 5 The heart of the Chevron analysis is
facts of Chevron do
found in the first step; unfortunately, however,5 the
6
not clearly illuminate the standard of this step.
The crucial concept of the first step of the Chevron analysis is that of
an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the agency. The Court
indicated that there is no delegation of authority to interpret the statutory term if Congress has directly spoken to the precise question of interpretation that is at issue and unambiguously expressed its intent as to the
resolution of the question.5 7 If Congress's expression is ambiguous, on
the other hand, then there is an implicit legislative delegation to the
agency on the particular question.5 8 The standard of the first step apparently demands a great deal of precision from Congress; in order to prevent a delegation of interpretive authority to an agency, Congress would
have to spell out clearly the meaning of any potentially ambiguous term.
Although the first step of the Chevron analysis seems to pose an
exacting standard, the facts of Chevron hardly press the limits of that
standard. The Court recognized that the statutory term at issue"source"-is inherently ambiguous and susceptible to a range of possible
disparate interpretations.5 9 Thus, although the statement of the first step
appears to demand an explicit expression of intent from Congress in order to avoid a "delegation" of authority, the application of the Chevron
facts to the analysis fails to define the "unambiguous expression"
standard.
The standard of review of the second step of the Chevron analysis is
exceedingly deferential. The reviewing court must uphold the agency in6
terpretation if it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." "
In determining whether the EPA regulation was a "permissible construceg., Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 33 (1983) (little
discontinuity between judicial review in administrative law and constitutional law). In reviewing an
administrative action, the court must first ask whether the agency had the authority to act, and if the
agency is authorized to act, then the court examines the substance of the action. Id. at 6, 25-28.
53. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2782.
56. See infra text accompanying note 59.
57. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.

58. Id at 2782.
59. Id at 2790 (listing the potential definitions of "source" identified by Court of Appeals).
60. Id at 2782 (emphasis added).
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tion" of section 172, the Court first noted that the agency interpretation
'61
was not an "affront to common English usage" of the word "source.
The level of deference, however, is perhaps best exemplified in the
Court's discussion of the agency interpretation's adherence to the policies
that motivated the congressional enactment: "whether or not we believe it
most effectively implements [the policy of achieving environmental objectives], we must recognize that the EPA has advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion ... ."62 Thus, the second step of the analysis
permits a reviewing court only a superficial examination of the agency
interpretation; judicial inquiry ceases if the agency can present a single
reasonable argument supporting its interpretation.
The Chevron Court had to examine the relationship between Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts to establish this framework
for judicial review. The inherent dilemma in judicial review of an
agency's construction of a statute results from the presence of two different interpreters-the court and the agency. 63 Chevron attempts to resolve this dilemma by providing that although the judiciary has final
authority on issues of statutory construction," "[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones
"65

It is certainly "the province and duty of the judicial department, to
say what the law is," because "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."' 66 In attempting to provide meaning to a statute, courts endeavor to discern Congress's intent.67 But if Congress does not clearly express its intent, then
the choice of an interpretation involves selection from a spectrum of
meanings, each representing a specific resolution of competing policies. 68
61. Id at 2790.
62. Id. at 2792 (emphasis added). The EPA argued that its interpretation served environmental

objectives because it would remove the disincentives-the requirements of section 173, see supranote
35-to modernization of existing facilities by encouraging replacement of older, dirtier pieces of
equipment with newer, cleaner ones. See 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281 (1981). The Court noted that this
view had support both in the record developed in the rulemaking process and in independent private
studies. Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2792 & nn.36-37.
63. See, eg., Monaghan, supra note 52, at 2-6 ("deference" implies displacement of judicial
judgment; the problem is in determining extent of displacement).
64. Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n.9.
65. Id. at 2793.
66. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
67. See, eg., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective in a case [involving statutory interpretation] is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative
will.").
68. The Court has recognized the legislative process is a battle of "opposing 'forces' of'radicalism and reaction' [that] are 'averaged' into some 'compromise measure.'" Note, Intent, ClearState-
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to perform
The Court has acknowledged that the judiciary is ill-suited
to legislating. 69

this function because it is tantamount

Congress, however, may delegate legislative authority to administra-

tive agencies.70 Chevron presumes that if Congress has not expressed its
intent on the precise question, then it has implicitly delegated the resolu-

tion of competing policy interests to the agencies. 71 In this manner,
Chevron treats some agency "interpretation" as "legislation. ' '7 2 The role

of the court, therefore, is not to interpret the statute,7 3 but to determine
the extent of the authority delegated and to ensure that the agency has

not overstepped this authority. 74

ments, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
892, 900 (1982) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1981) (plurality opinion)); see
also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 91 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("legislative process. . . inevitably involves a series of compromises among different group interests"). If
legislation is the process of competition among policy interests, then a choice of an interpretation of
an unclear statute is a choice among policies.
69. See, eg., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (Court not competent to entertain arguments addressing the propriety of denying micro-organisms patent protection as matter of
policy; resolution of matter of policy requires study that legislative bodies can provide and courts
cannot); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296-97 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court) (analysis of sociological and political factors to determine harm from past
discrimination for variety of minority groups is beyond judicial competence).
70. See, eg., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-27 (1944) (delegation to agency to
promulgate regulations fixing "fair and equitable" prices of commodities held constitutional). "Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers." Id at 425-26.
71. Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, 2793. The Court stated:
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created. . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap
left, implicitly or explicity, by Congress." . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.
Id at 2782 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (footnotes omitted)).
72. The portion of the opinion quoted supra note 71 is indicative of the conceptualization of
agency interpretation. The Court provides that where Congress has left an implicit gap in the statute, it delegates authority to formulate policy and make rules to fill the gap-in other words, to
legislate. See id By structuring the relationship of courts and agencies in this manner, the issue is
no longer the interpretation of the statute, but whether the agency acted within the boundaries of the
implicit delegation. Because of this supervisory role, the "court becomes a part of the administrative
process rather than a hostile stranger." Note, supra note 1, at 106; see also Monaghan, supra note
52, at 33 (judicial duty is not to supply all of the relevant meaning of statutes, but to ensure that
agency stays within zone of discretion conferred on it by statute).
73. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court's present view of statutory
interpretation is not a judicial search for the "true" meaning of the statute: "When Congress has not
addressed specific issues or has done so ambiguously, statutory interpretation ceases to be solely a
problem of discovering meaning. Instead, interpretation becomes an issue of institutional competence and authority." Note, supra note 68, at 899 (footnote omitted).
74. Professor Monaghan has recently argued for just such an approach:
The court's interpretational task is.. . to determine the boundaries of delegated authority.
A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administrative "interpretation" of a
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Although the Court has utilized this model in the past,75 in those
cases the delegation was seen to be intentional. 76 The thrust of Chevron
is that this model applies regardless of whether Congress "consciously"
intended the delegation. 77 By recharacterizing the analysis from one of
review of an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute to one of re-

view of an agency's exercise of legitimate law-making authority, Chevron
dramatically reshapes the underlying concepts of this area of administrative law.
IV.
A.

THE IMPACT OF CHEVRON ON SUBSEQUENT CASES

Securities Industry.

Two cases decided shortly after Chevron illuminate the application
of the Chevron test although neither explicitly employs the two-step
statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some substantive
law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency. Where deference exists, the
court must specify the boundaries of agency authority, within which the agency is authorized to fashion authoritatively part, often a large part, of the meaning of the statute. By
contrast, to the extent that the court interprets the statute to direct it to supply meaning, it
interprets the statute to exclude delegated administrative law-making power.
Monaghan, supra note 52, at 6. Monaghan notes that the "case law can be rationalized on such a
basis-whether or not all cases were in fact decided with such a perception clearly in mind." Id. at
30.
75. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 3132 (1981) (if statute admits to more than one interpretation, function of court is to determine
whether agency "acted within the authority vested in it by Congress"); FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596, 604 (1981) (weighing policies to determine meaning of statutory standard
is task delegated to agency; court is to determine only whether interpretation is inconsistent with
boundaries established in statute); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)
("[J]udges ought to refrain from substituting their own interstitial lawmaking for that of [an agency],
so long as the latter's lawmaking is not irrational.").
76. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37
(1981) (Act provides that agency ruling on statute should not be reversed unless "contrary to law");
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1981) (Act failed to define standard of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" and granted general rulemaking authority to agency; the
Court viewed the statute as "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (Court recognized that "language in the legislative history evinces a
decided preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform administrative decision, rather than
piecemeal through litigation").
77. The Court stated:
In this case, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
Congress intended to
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference ....
accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by
this case. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhapsit simply did not
consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the
scheme devised by the agency. Forjudicialpurposes, it matters not which of these things
occurred.
Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2793 (emphasis added).
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method of analysis. In those two cases, both titled Securities Industry
Association v. Board of Governors,78 the Supreme Court reviewed the

Federal Reserve Board's interpretations of certain provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act.

In SecuritiesIndustry I, the Board determined that sections 16 and
21 of the Glass-Steagall Act did not preclude a commercial bank from
underwriting its customers' commercial paper. 79 Section 16 prohibits

commercial banks from underwriting "securities or stock," 80 and section
21 prohibits any institution involved in underwriting "stocks, bonds, de-

bentures, notes, or other securities" from engaging in commercial banking.8 1 The Board concluded that because commercial paper was a

nonequity instrument, the proscriptions of sections 16 and 21 did not
82

apply.
In setting the standard of review, the Supreme Court stated that it

must reject the Board's construction of the statute if it was "inconsistent

with the statutory mandate, ' '8 3 but, nonetheless, the Board's interpreta-

tion was "entitled to substantial deference." ' 84 Analysis of the statute and
its legislative history revealed that Congress, in separating commercial
banking and investment banking, was concerned with two issues. First,
Congress was aware of the risks involved in the securities business and
the subsequent erosion of public confidence in a depository institution

that loses money from an "imprudent investment" in "speculative securi78. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984) [SecuritiesIndustry
I], and Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1983) [SecuritiesIndustry

II].
79. See Securities Industry , 104 S. Ct. at 2982. "Commercial paper" consists of unsecured,
short-term promissory notes, issued by business entities and made payable to the bearer. Comment,
The CommercialPaperMarket and the SecuritiesActs, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 362, 363 (1972) (discussing characteristics of "commercial paper"). The instruments generally mature within thirty to
ninety days, and typically are rolled-over to the same or different investor at the market rate at the
time of maturity. Id. at 363-64.
80. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184-85 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1982)).
81. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 21(a)(1), 48 Stat. 162, 189 (codified at amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 378 (a)(1)(1982)). The Board noted that although commercial paper fit within the broad categories of "notes" or "securities," Congress had intended only to prohibit commercial banks from engaging in investment transactions and accordingly limited the terms to financial instruments that
evidenced an investment transaction. Securities Industry , 104 S. Ct. at 2982.
82. Id. The Board adopted a functional interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act, stating that it
"was plainly designed to keep banks from engaging in the investment banking business, not to prohibit banks from performing the traditional function of banks." Petition for Certiorari at 65a, 74a,
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984) (reprint of Board's decision). The Board determined that the commercial paper being sold appeared to evidence transactions more like commercial lending than the sale of investments. Id. at 78a.
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2983.
84. Id.
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ties."18 5 Second, Congress was cognizant of the conflict of interest arising

if a single institution acts as an "important source of financial advice...
[on] how best to issue equity or debt securities"8 6 while simultaneously
entertaining the prospect of potential pecuniary gain from the method of
issuance.87 The Court concluded that "[t]hrough fiat prohibitions, the

Act sought to 'separat[e] as completely as possible commercial from investment banking,' "88 and thus was intended to be "a strong
prophylaxis."' 9
The Court then examined the statutory terms at issue, concluding
that nothing in the statute mandated a narrow interpretation. 90 Moreover, because the definition of "security" in other statutes enacted contemporaneously with the Glass-Steagall Act included commercial paper

and provided explicit exemptions if a specific provision was not intended
to apply to commercial paper, it was clear that Congress understood "security" to encompass commercial paper. 91 Because the Board's interpretation was thus inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, that
92
portion of its opinion was invalidated.
The dissent, 9 3 in setting out the standard of review, noted that the
"relevant statutes are far from clear" and thus "the Board's interpretation. . . must be sustained unless it is unreasonable."' 94 The dissent first
noted that the statutory language had no "plain meaning" because the
terms "securities" and "notes" are not defined by the statute and are not
85. Id. at 2984.
86. Id. Congress observed that commercial bankers "routinely advise[d] clients on a variety of
financial matters such as whether and how best to issue equity or debt securities." Id.
87. Id. ("Congress concluded that it was unrealistic to expect a banker to give impartial advice
about such matters if he stands to realize as a profit from the underwriting or distribution of
securities.").
88. Id. at 2985 (quoting Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 70 (1981)).
89. Securities Industry , 104 S. Ct. at 2986.
90. Id. at 2987.
91. Id The Court examined provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)); and the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6
(1982)). Securities Industry , 104 S. Ct. at 2987.
92. Securities Industry 1 104 S. Ct. at 2981 ("Because commercial paper falls within the plain
language of the Act, and because the inclusion of commercial paper within the terms of the Act is
fully consistent with the Act's purposes, we conclude that commercial paper is a 'security' under the
Glass-Steagall Act.").
For a detailed discussion of the Glass-Steagall Act and commercial paper, see Note, A ConductOriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102, 116-20 (1981) (concluding that
Board's interpretation that commercial paper is not a "security" "frustrates the objectives of the
Act").
93. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Brennan, dissented. Securities Industry I,
104 S. Ct. at 2992 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
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universally understood to include commercial paper. 95 The dissent argued that the meaning of a term in one statute is of dubious utility in

determining the meaning of the same term in an independent statute be-

cause different statutory purposes may alter the definition of the term.9 6
The dissent analyzed the Board's interpretation and found it a reasonable-and "perhaps the inevitab[le]" 97-construction of the statute.98
The second case, Securities Industry II, involved the Federal Re-

serve Board's decision approving the acquisition of a retail securities brokerage by a bank holding company. 99 Two statutes presented potential

bars to the merger.l10 Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act
authorizes bank holding companies to engage in non-banking activities
only if those activities are "so closely related to banking.. . as to be a
proper incident thereto." 10 1 The Board determined that commercial
banks typically offer services identical to those provided by the particular

retail securities broker involved in the merger, 10 2 and therefore concluded that the activities involved were "closely related" to banking
13
within the meaning of section 4(c)(8). 0

Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act' °4 posed the second potential
statutory obstacle. That provision prohibits commercial banks from becoming affiliated with an organization "engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution.

. .

of stocks, bonds,

debentures, notes, or other securities." 10 5 The Board held that the target
retail securities brokerage was not principally engaged in any of the ac-

tivities listed in section

20.106

95. The dissent stated, "The Glass-Steagall Act nowhere defines the term 'securities,' and the

term is not so well-defined, either generally or as a legal term of art, that commercial paper is plainly
included within its meaning." Id. at 2994 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent, citing to recent
authorities, found the terms "securities" and "notes" to be susceptible of both broad and narrow
definitions. Id (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 956 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "note") and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 724-25 (G. Murn & F. Garcia eds. 8th ed. 1983) (defining

"note").

96. Securities Industry , 104 S.Ct. at 2999-3000 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
97. Id. at 2993.
98. Id. at 3003 O'Connor, J., dissenting.
99. Securities Industry II, 104 S.Ct. at 3006.
100. Id. at 3006-07.
101. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(c)(8), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
102. SecuritiesIndustry 1I, 104 S.Ct. at 3007. The brokerage house involved in the case was the
Charles Schwab Corp., a "discount" broker that "does not provide investment advice or analysis,
but merely executes the purchase and sell orders placed by its customers." Id. at 3005 n.2.
103. Id.at 3007.
104. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 20,48 Stat. 162, 188-89 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982)).
105. Id.
106. Securities Industry II, 104 S.Ct. at 3007.
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The Court, in reviewing the Board's interpretation of section 4(c)(8),
reasoned that because Congress failed to specify the factors used to determine whether an activity is "closely related" to banking, it "vested the
Board with considerable discretion." 10 7 Thus, the Board's interpretation
was entitled to the "greatest deference." 10 8 The Court found that the
standard applied by the Board-operational and functional similarity to
services generally provided by banks-was reasonable. 10 9
The Court also ruled that the Board's interpretation of section 20 of
the Glass-Steagall Act was both reasonable and consistent with legisla0 The challenge to the Board's interpretation focused on the
tive intent. 10
construction of the phrase "public sale.""' The Court noted that the
words used in conjunction with "public sale"-"issue, flotation, underwriting [and] distribution"' 1 2 -described the traditional functions of investment banking, not securities brokerage, and therefore the term
"public sale" was used to proscribe underwriting activity. 113 This interpretation was further supported by the underlying purposes of the GlassSteagall Act. Echoing the Securities Industry I decision, 114 the Court
noted that concerns about potential losses from securities speculation
and other hazards associated with underwriting had motivated Congress
to enact that statute separating commercial banks from entities involved
in underwriting. 1 5 The Court concluded that the brokerage activity involved-the buying and selling of securities as an agent-did not trigger
116
those concerns.
The two Securities Industry opinions do employ a "Chevron "-type
analysis, although neither opinion cites Chevron nor explicitly outlines
the two-step method of analysis. In SecuritiesIndustry I, the Court first
focused on the expression of congressional intent. The majority contended that Congress could not have expressed its intent in a clearer
107. Id. at 3008.
108. Id. at 3009 (quoting Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981)).

109. See Securities Industry II, 104 S. Ct. at 3008-09. The Court stated:
In this case, the Board has articulated with commendable thoroughness the ways in which
banking activities are similar to the brokerage activities at issue here. The standard the
Board used to determine that Schwab's brokerage business is "closely related" to banking
is reasonable and supported by a normal reading of the statutory language of § 4(c)(8).

Id. at 3009.
110. Id at 3012.

111. Id at 3009.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Banking Act of 1933,
Securities Industry I,
See supra notes 86-89
Securities Industry II,
Id. at 3011-12.

ch. 89, § 20, 48 Stat. 162, 188 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982)).
104 S. Ct. at 3010.
and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 3011.
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manner.' 17 Under the Chevron analysis, this would render the first step
dispositive. The dissenting justices disagreed with that position, arguing

that Congress did not address the precise question at issue in either the
statute or the legislative history. 118 The dissent then proceeded to the
second step to its "Chevron"-type analysis, determining that the Board's
interpretation was not inconsisent with the statutory language and the
legislative history.1 19
Securities Industry II also illustrates the operation of the two-step
analysis. The Court first recognized that the use of the ambiguous statu-

tory term "closely related" without concurrent provision of any clarifying definition signalled Congress' implicit intention to vest the Board

with substantial interpretive authority.1 20 The Court then proceeded to
the second step of its analysis, reviewing the Board's statutory interpreta1 21
tion with the "greatest deference."

The Securities Industry cases do not, however, apply the Chevron
framework; statements in both opinions are markedly inconsistent with
the Chevron analysis. 122 Yet both opinions do follow the general twostep analysis, applying standards substantially equivalent to those devel-

oped in Chevron. Perhaps this is best explained by reference to Professor
Monaghan's observation made while discussing the application of an analytic framework quite similar to the Chevron analysis and prior case

law: "The case[s] can be rationalized on such a basis [a "Chevron "-type
analysis]-whether or not all cases were in fact decided with such a clear
117. The Court believed that the Congress that passed the Glass-Steagall Act understood "securities" and "notes" to include commercial paper, and chose expansive terms in order to secure a
prophylactic effect. The Court examined the statute as well as contemporaneous statutes and their
legislative history in determining that the Congress that enacted the Glass-Steagall Act understood
"securities" and "notes" to include commercial paper. See Securities Industry 1 104 S. Ct. at 298687. The Court placed great weight on statements made at congressional hearings, noting that at
hearings involving the Securities Act of 1933, Senator Glass objected to the use of the terms "security" and "note" because they plainly included commercial paper, but at hearings on the GlassSteagall Act held two weeks later, the "eponymous" Senator Glass made no such objection to the use
of the same terms. Id. at 2987. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
122. In Securities Industry I, for example, the Court states that because the position taken by the
Board at oral argument was slightly different than that found in the Board's written opinion, its
interpretation was not entitled to "full deference." See SecuritiesIndustry 1, 104 S. Ct. at 2983-84.
If the Court had strictly followed a Chevron analysis and found no ambiguity in the statutory language, then its statements concerning "deference" were superfluous. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31 (1981) (court of appeals discussion of
extent of deference to agency interpretation was "pointless" if court was correct that interpretation
violated plain language of statute).
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perception in mind."' 123
B.

Chemical Manufacturers.

In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council,124 the Supreme Court appears to have removed the doubts
created by the Securities Industry cases concerning the application of
Chevron. In ChemicalManufacturers, both the majority 2 5 and dissenting126 opinions explicitly relied on Chevron as providing the proper analytic framework.

Chemical Manufacturers involved section 301 (1) of the Clean
Water Act, which prohibits the EPA from "modify[ing] any requirement
of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic
pollutant list." 127 Section 301 requires the EPA to promulgate regulations categorizing sources of pollution and setting effluent limitations for
each category.' 28 Section 307 of the Act requires the agency to set effluent limitations for toxic pollutants for each category established under

section 301 at a level consonate with the "best available technology economically achievable."' 129 Against this statutory framework, the EPA established the requisite categories and promulgated effluent limitations for
each category,1 30 but provided a method by which an individual polluter
13
could seek a "variance" from the specified limits. '
A variance could be obtained by any interested person if data specific to an individual polluter indicated that factors fundamentally differ-

ent from those considered by the EPA in establishing the standards for
the category justified a different discharge limit. 132 This fundamentally
123. Monaghan, supra note 52, at 30.
124. 53 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1985).
125. Chemical Mfrm, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4196.
126. Id. at 4203 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Clean Water Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(c), 91 Stat. 1566, 1590 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982)) (adding § 301(l) to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
128. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86
Stat.816, 844-845 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982)) (adding section 301(b) to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act).
129. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a)(2), 91 Stat. 1566, 1589-90 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 1317 (a)(2) (1982)) (adding section 307(a)(2) to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act).
130. The EPA acted only after prodding by the Natural Resources Defense Council. The EPA
promulgated standards and established categories in compliance with a consent decree. See Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), modified sub
nom. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979),
modified sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, No. 72-2153 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
1982), modified sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Ruckelshaus, No. 73-2153 (D.D.C.
Aug. 2, 1983 & Jan. 6, 1984).
131. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1984) (fundamentally different factor (FDF) variances).
132. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(b)(1) (1984).
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different factor (FDF) variance could be sought either to raise or to lower
133
the applicable limit.

Environmental and industrial organizations brought suit against the
EPA, alleging that section 301 (1), with its prohibition against "modifications" of toxic pollutant standards, barred the EPA from granting FDF
variances to dischargers of toxics.134 Although the Fourth Circuit had

earlier found the statute ambiguous and accordingly deferred to the
EPA's interpretation, 135 the Third Circuit accepted the challengers' ar136
guments and invalidated the regulation.
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision,1 37 citing
Chevron as establishing the proper framework for reviewing the agency's
interpretation. 13 8 Addressing the question of the first step of the Chevron
analysis, the Chemical Manufacturers Court looked to the statute and

concluded that a literal interpretation of section 301 (l)'s ban on "modifications" would cause a direct conflict with a section of the act (section

307(b)(2)) that explicitly allows the EPA to "revise" the effluent limitations for toxics. 139 The EPA argued that an FDF variance was a revision
sanctioned by section 307(b)(2) and section 301 (1) was intended to refer
to sections 301(c) and 301(g), which explicitly allow the agency to "modify" the requirements of the section under certain circumstances.140 Be-

cause the statute could not be read literally without creating an
irreconcilable conflict between sections of the same act, the Court con133. Id.
134. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 636, 643 (3d Cir. 1983) (consolidation of sixteen separate suits), rev'd sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 53 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1985).
135. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1040, 1047-48 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding
FDF variances as applied to toxics).
136. Metal Finishers, 719 F.2d at 644-46.
137. ChemicalMfrm, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4198.
138. Id. at 4196.
139. Id. Section 307(b)(2) provides: "The Administrator shall, from time to time, as control
technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives change, revise such standards following the procedure established by this section for promulgation of such standards." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(b)(2) (1982) (section 307(b)(2) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act). Section 301 (1)
provides: "The Administrator may not modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any
specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list under section 1317(a)(1) of this title." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(l) (1982) (section 301(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
140. ChemicalMfrs, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4196-97. Section 301(c) authorizes the EPA to modify the
standards established for a category of dischargers as they apply to a specific discharger upon a
showing by the owner or operator of a plant of maximum use of technology within the economic
capability of the owner or operator and reasonable progress toward the elimination of the discharge
of pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982) (section 301(c) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act). Section 301(g) authorizes modification upon a showing that the modification will not adversely affect water quality, aquatic wildlife, or human health. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (1982) (section
301(g) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
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. . has no plain meaning as used in
§ 301(l), and is the proper subject of construction by EPA and the

cluded that the term "modify .
14 1

courts."

Turning to the legislative history, the Court found nothing indicating an intent to forbid FDF waivers. 142 The Court noted that although
section 301(l) was added in conference, the conference committee report
failed to explain its inclusion. 14 3 The Court found this silence to be significant. In E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,144 the Court had suggested that FDF variances were a permissible regulatory mechanism.
The Court reasoned that because the Du Pont decision was announced
several months before the conference committee added section 301(l), it
certainly would have been "odd" for the committee to include in the act
language that reversed the thrust of a recent Supreme Court decision and
45
then fail to communicate its intent to either house.1
Further, the Court noted that although several legislators had used
the terms "waivers," "modifications," and "variances" interchangeably
in debate, 14 6 the manager of the bill in the House explained section
301(l) in a manner directly supporting the agency's interpretation. 147
The Court concluded that the legislative history did not evince a clear
congressional intent to preclude the use of FDF variances with respect to
toxic pollutants and accordingly proceeded to the second step of the

Chevron analysis. 148

In applying the second step of the analysis, the Court first asked
whether the FDF variance mechanism would "frustrate the goals and
operation of the statutory scheme."' 149 The Court reasoned that because
the FDF variance procedure allows the EPA to consider factors peculiar
to an individual discharger that may not have been sufficiently weighed
in drafting the standards for a category of polluters, the variance mecha141. Chemical Mfrs, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4196.

142. Id. at 4197.
143. Id at 4196.
144. 430 U.S. 112, 127-28 (1977).
145. Chemical Mfr, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4196-97.
146. Id. at 4197 (citing statements of Sen. Muskie, Senate manager of the bill and Rep. Roberts,
House manager of the bill).
147. The Court quoted Representative Roberts, the House floor manager, who in explaining

section 301(l) stated:
Due to the nature of toxic pollutants, those identified for regulation will not be subject to
waivers from or modification of the requirements prescribed under this section, specifically
neither section 301(c) waivers based on economic capability of the dischargernor 301(g)
waivers based on water quality considerationsshall be available.
Id at 4196 (emphasis supplied by the Court) (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 38,960 (1977) (statement of
Rep. Roberts)).
148. Id. at 4197.

149. Id.
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nism is "not an exception to the standard-setting process] commanded by
section 307], but rather a more fine-tuned application of it."150 Recognizing this, the CQurt stated that the dispute essentially centered on the
means employed by the EPA in defining the standards for subcategories
of polluters and could be summarized simply as an argument between
differing policies. 15 1 The Court concluded that because the EPA's interpretation was not inconsistent with the language, legislative history, and
15 2
operation of the Act, it was entitled to deference.
Unlike Chevron, the Chemical Manufacturers decision was not
unanimous; four justices including Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, joined in dissent.15 3 The dissent, however, agreed with the majority
in explicitly adopting the Chevron analysis. 154 The disagreement arose in
the application of the first-step test-whether "Congress clearly intended
that § 30 1(/) do more than just ban modifications otherwise permitted by

§ 301(c) and (g) . ..

",155

Justice Marshall, writing for the dissenters, noted that although the
statute does not explicitly define "modifications," there is nothing on the
face of section 301 (1) from which to infer that its prohibition is qualified.1 56 Further, the legislative history of the provision not only failed to
provide support for the EPA's narrow interpretation of "modify," but
evidenced a "clear congressional intent" to ban all modifications. 157 The
dissent cited statements of congressmen, made on the floor, indicating
that Congress in drafting the 1977 amendments was deeply concerned
with the problems presented by toxic pollutants.15 8 Several congressmen
realized that the statutory prohibitions of toxic pollution would lead to
extremely restrictive regulation of industry, resulting in costs to industry
of "millions of dollars."' 159 The dissent explained that congressional
150. Id.
151. Id. The Court made implicit reference to Chevron in discussing the role of the courts in
reviewing an agency's policy choice:
Here we are not dealing with an agency's change of position with the advent of a different
administration, but rather with EPA's consistent interpretation since the the [sic] 1970s.
NRDC aruges that its construction of the statute is better supported by policy considerations. But we do not sit to judge the relative wisdom of competing statutory interpretations.
Id. at 4198.
152. Id. at 4198.

153. Id. at 4198 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
154. Id at 4203 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

156. Id at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Id at 4199 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
158. Id at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing remarks of Sen. Muskie and Rep. Roberts).
159. Id at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 38,952 (1977) (statement of

Rep. Roberts)).
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awareness of the tremendous costs that would be imposed or industry led
to the inclusion of section 301(c), which tempered the requirements of
section 301 where strict adherence would cause bankruptcy. 16° The dissent saw the same congressional concern as motivating the modification
provision of section 301(g).1 6 1 Marshall then reasoned that because Congress had provided modification procedures only where the social concern was great, the EPA interpretation of section 301(l) that barred
modifications under sections 301(c) and 301(g)-where ,the social concern was the greatest-but allowing modifications as FDF variances"the least compelling case for modification"-was "wholly counterintuitive." 1 62 Turning to statements made by congressmen in debate, the dissent found support for its interpretation of section 301(l). The dissent
cited statements of both the manager of the bill in the House and the
manager in the Senate to the effect that requirements for toxic pollutants
1 63
could not be waived.
The dissent found the majority's reliance on Congress's failure to
amend the Act to reverse explicitly the Court's decision in E.L duPont de
Nemours v. Train,164 which sanctioned the EPA's use of FDF variances, 165 unfounded. In Dupont, the dissent argued, the Court upheld
the EPA's use of FDF variances where the statute provided for regulation of "point sources." 1 66 Yet for toxic pollutants, the statute requires
regulation "'for the applicable category or class of point sources.' ",167
The dissent concluded that because Dupont had merely sanctioned a regulatory device-FDF variances-that adjusted standards for specific
point source where the statute commanded regulation of point sources, it
did not send a message to Congress that the same regulatory device was
appropriate where the statute required regulation by category. 168 Thus
169
congressional failure to act on Dupont was not significant.
Further, the dissent concluded that because the Act contemplates
revision of standards of toxic effluents by categories of polluters,1 70 the
160. ChemicalMfrm, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of section
301(c), see supra note 142.
161. ChemicalMfra, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of section
301(g), see supra note 140.
162. Chemical Mfrs., 53 U.S.L.W. at 4201 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 4202-03 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).

164. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
165.
166.
167.
(1982)).
168.
169.

Chemical Mfr., 53 U.S.L.W. at 4202 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id at 4202 (emphasis supplied by Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)
Chemical Mfrs., 53 U.S.L.W. at 4202 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).

170. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(2)-(3) (1982).
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FDF variance mechanism, which effectively provides for plant-by-plant
regulation, is wholly inappropriate. 171 The dissent noted that Congress
called for regulation by categories as a "means to 'force' the introduction
of more effective pollution control technology" because in establishing
the effluent standards for a category, EPA was to look to the "best performer" in that category. 172 To allow a discharger an FDF variance
would frustrate the congressional goal of forcing the discharger to develop more effective pollution control technology. 173 Accordingly, the
dissent concluded that Congress had "clearly intended that § 301(/) ban
variances such as those at issue here." 174
The dissent emphasized that its analysis was the Chevron analysis,
but "Chevron's deference requirement. . was explicitly limited to cases
in which congressional intent cannot be discerned through the use of
traditional techniques of statutory interpretation."1 7 5 Justice Marshall
made that point clear:
My disagreement with the Court does not center on its reading of
Chevron, but instead on its analysis of the congressional purposes behind § 301(l). If I agreed with the Court's analysis of the statute and
the legislative history, I too would conclude 176
that Chevron commands
deference to the administrative construction.
ChemicalManufacturers sheds significant light on the question that
Chevron failed to illuminate: what is the standard in judging "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue[?]" 177 In
17 8
Chemical Manufacturers,the statute did not define the term at issue;
the term was a part of a section added in conference 79 and the conference report failed to discuss the impact of the added section. 180 On all
these points, the majority and dissent agreed. The disagreement arose
over the intensity of the justices' search for a "clear congressional
intent."
The majority first noted the facial conflict between section 301(l)prohibiting "modifications"-and section 307(b)(2)-allowing "revision[s]." 1 81 This conflict, the Court stated, made the term "modify" "the
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Chemical Mfr&, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4203-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id at 4204 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id at 4205 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id at 4203 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984).
Chemical Mfr., 53 U.S.L.W. at 4196, 4200.
Id at 4196, 4201 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id
Id at 4196.
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proper subject of construction by EPA and the courts. ' 182 The Court
then failed to find any explicit statement made by any congressional body
that precluded the EPA's interpretation. 183 To the Court, the facial conflict between the provisions coupled with the failure of any congressional
body to explain the intended scope of the term "modify" was sufficient
evidence that Congress had not addressed the precise question at issue.
The dissent argued that the majority failed to find a "clear congressional intent" because it failed to examine the statute in light of its general purpose. 184 To the dissenting justices, Congress was concerned only
with the dangers of toxic pollutants and sought regulation in spite of the
cost to industry. 185 After thus identifying the "congressional purpose,"
the dissent noted "that a complete ban on modifications would most directly and completely accomplish the congressional goal."' 18 6 Clearly the
difference between the analyses of the majority and dissent is the use of
"congressional purpose."
Chevron does not explicitly sanction either view. The Chevron
Court in examining the legislative history of the statute found no "specific comment on the 'bubble concept' or the question whether a
plantwide definition of a stationary source is permissible."1 8 7 The Court
then stated that the legislative history did reveal Congress's "two main
purposes" in enacting the statute.1 88 However, the Chevron Court gave
no indication that consideration of the "purpose" of the statute would be
a judicially permissible way of determining whether Congress spoke to
189
the precise question at issue.
However, Chevron implies that "clear congressional intent" is not
expressed when a court must resort to the general purposes of the statute
in order to resolve the interpretive question. In Chevron, the Court reversed a decision in which the court of appeals interpreted the term
"source" by considering the general purpose of the statute in which it
appeared, 190 even though it had concluded that Congress had not explic182. I
183. See id. at 4196-97 (finding nothing in legislative history that evinces an unambiguous con-

gressional intention).
184. Id. at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 4199-4200, 4202-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

186. Id. at 4200 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2786.
188. Id. (clean environment and continued economic growth).
189. In indicating that the legislative history revealed the statute to be the product of conflicting

policy objectives, the Court did not indicate the relevancy of this observation to the issue of whether
Congress directly spoke to the precise question. See id.
190. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).
The court of appeals relied on two prior decisions that had involved the EPA's interpretation of
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itly defined the term and the issue was not "squarely addressed in the
legislative history." 19 1 The Chevron Court deemed this a "basic legal
192
error."'
Further, a judicial finding that Congress had directly spoken to the
precise question resting on arguments developed in considering the general purposes of the statute violates the fundamental teaching of Chevron.
As the Court has made clear on several occasions, a statute represents a
compromise of conflicting purposes and policies. 193 Thus for a court to
determine the congressional purpose in enacting a statute, it must weigh
the various policies present in the compromise. It is this type of judicial
balancing that Chevron clearly forbids. 194 ChemicalManufacturersclarifies what was implicit in Chevron-that reasoning from the general purposes of the statute is not one of the "traditioonal tools of statutory
construction"1 95 to be employed in determining whether Congress di196
rectly spoke to the precise question at issue.
source-Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA,
578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F. 2d 718, 72526 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984). The court read these two cases as requiring a bifurcated interpretation of the
term "source" as it was used in different sections of the act, allowing the "bubble concept" where the
purpose of the provision was to maintain air quality, disapproving of it where the purpose was to
improve air quality. Id The court concluded that since the general purpose of the provision involved-its "raison d'etre"--was to improve air quality, the EPA's use of the "bubble concept" was
inappropriate. Id. at 726-28.
191. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F. 2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd
sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Reseources Defense Council, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).
192. Chevron, 104 S.CL at 2781. The Court stated: "The basic legal error of the Court of
Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term stationary source when it had decided
that Congress itself had not commanded that definition." Id. The "static judicial definition" was
developed by considering the general purpose of the statute. See supra note 190.
193. See supra note 68. Indeed, in section 307 of the Clean Water Act, Congress was concerned
with more than the protection of human health. If that was its sole concern it would have required
zero-discharge levels for toxics instead of limiting the level to the "best available technology economically achievable." 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1982) (standard for toxic effluents).
194. See supra text accompanying note 65.
195. Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n.9.
196. This view is in accord with the "clear statement" model developed to explain recent
Supreme Court cases involving statutory interpretation. See Note, supra note 68, at 899-904. The
commentator notes that "judicial reliance on legislative purpose-the touchstone of those recently
abandoned modes of interpretation-is now perceived as usurpation of legislative power that produces both illegitimate and incompetent judicial interference in statutory schemes." Id. at 900 (footnotes omitted). If this is truely the Court's view of statutory interpretation, the first step of the
Chevron analysis may require an explicit congressional statement of the meaning of statutory terms
in order to find an "unambiguously expressed intent."
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CONCLUSION

In the study ofjudicial review, it is wise to remember that commentators present models as attempts to explain the thought processes of
judges as manifested in court opinions. Because opinions do not always
articulate the actual analyses employed, 197 models of judicial review are
developed by extrapolating a logical framework from the actions of a
court. Although these extrajudicial models suffer from this inherent
flaw, they often provide the only guidance to lower courts to determine
the proper analytic framework for structuring review. Thus it is highly
significant when the Supreme Court does articulate an analytic
framework.
In Chevron, the Court presented a framework for structuring judicial review that provides meaningful review while prohibiting judicial infringement on an agency's legitimate authority. The two-step analysis
ensures that the governmental bodies charged with making policy decisions-Congress and the agencies-will actually make those decisions
and that the admittedly ilU-equipped courts will abstain. 198 Furthermore,
by extending the interstitial lawmaking model to implicit delegations of
interpretive authority, Chevron focuses judicial inquiry on two separate
issues. Chevron avoids the inherent confusion created when a court attempts to balance its independent perception of the proper statutory construction and its deference to the agency's interpretation. Chevron
directs the court to ask initially whether Congress, in drafting the statute,
,dealt with the interpretive issue; if Congress did not, then the court examines the agency's interpretation to determine whether the agency has
properly exercised its legitimate interstitial lawmaking authority by
adopting an interpretation that is reasonably supported by the statute
and legislative history.1 99
As noted previously, the heart of the Chevron analysis is the judicial
determination whether Congress has "unambiguously" expressed its intent. Chemical Manufacturers provides greater meaning to the "unambiguous" standards indicating that the Court will not look to the general
197. See DAvis, 1982 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, § 29.00-6, at 562-63 (many opinions refuse to
clarify choice between rational basis test and "rightness" approach).
198. The Court stated:
[Aln agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2793. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.

199. See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82.
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purposes of the statute in determining whether Congress has clearly expressed its intent. Yet even this apparently simple standard conceals a
fundamental uncertainty. In innumerable cases, the justices of the
Supreme Court have arrived at opposite conclusions regarding the meaning of the same statute without relying on an argument concerning the
general purposes of the statute;20° a slight alteration in the focus of inquiry affords no basis to expect sudden unanimity of judgment. The significance and the purpose of the Chevron analysis, however, is not to
foreordain the outcome of a particular case, but to focus the inquiry on
20 1
the appropriate questions.
Although Chemical Manufacturers demonstrates the potential significance of Chevron, the true significance of the decision depends on subsequent case development. Certainly, Chevron contains a message both
for the lower courts and for Congress. 20 2 Courts are to avoid excessive
interference in agency policy choices, while Congress should avoid drafting broad delegations to agencies in vague statutes, expecting the courts
to control the interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms.20 3 However,
the force of these messages depends upon the Court's explicit adherence
to Chevron.
Stephen M Lynch

200. Some recent examples are: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories,
460 U.S. 150 (1983) (interpretation of § 13 of Robinson-Patman Act; five justices vote to reverse
court of appeals, four dissent in two opinions); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63
(1982) (construction of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964; five justices vote to reverse court of
appeals, four dissent in two opinions); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981) (interpretation
of provision of Labor-Management Relations Act; eight justices vote to reverse court of appeals, one
dissents); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981) (issue was whether 1964 statute superseded 1920 act;
six justices vote to affirm court of appeals, with one concurring separate opinion, three dissent).
201. The purpose of the Chevron analysis, as is true of any analytical framework, is not to predestine the decision of any controversy: "The test channels the search for an answer but the answer
ultimately depends on the appreciation of the particular judge." Jaffe, supra note 1, at 264.
202. See DeLong, supra note 36, at 7 (Chevron contains messages to courts about perceived
judicial overintrusiveness and to Congress regarding control of agencies given broad and amorphous
delegations).
203. Id

